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The Fairness Doctrine'-and broadcasters' obligation to present
both sides of controversial public issues-died last August in a Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) hearing room.2 Congress'
attempts to prolong the Doctrine's life had been halted at the Presi-
dent's desk just six weeks before. 3 The repeal of the Fairness Doc-
trine has meant more than an end to a system of regulation that
broadcasters claimed was onerous; it has caused a reversal of the
"unusual order of First Amendment values" 4 in broadcasting, under
which the right of viewers and listeners to be informed is paramount
to the right of station owners to determine what shall be broadcast.
This Current Topic argues that the Doctrine's demise should also
mean new life for the previously discarded concept of broadcast ac-
cess, at least for editorial advertisements.
5
The current treatment of editorial advertisements illustrates well
the new balance that has been struck between broadcasters' inter-
ests in controlling content and the public's need for information.
Broadcast licensees are free to accept or reject whichever editorial
advertisements they choose. In the absence of the Fairness Doc-
trine's requirement of roughly balanced treatment of controversial
issues, stations can run these spots as often as their sponsors can
afford and give the viewpoints expressed in them as much additional
coverage in regular programming as the broadcasters see fit. Oppo-
1. The Fairness Doctrine was formulated under the Federal Communications Com-
mission's power to issue regulations consistent with the "public interest." The doctrine
imposes two affirmative responsibilities on broadcasters: coverage of issues of public
importance must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints. Under the
complementary Cullman Doctrine, Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 895
(1963), contrasting views must be presented at the broadcaster's expense if sponsorship
is unavailable. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969).
2. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, FCC
87-266 (rel. Aug. 6, 1987) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
3. S. 742 would have codified the Fairness Doctrine. Veto of the Fairness in Broad-
casting Act of 1987, Message to the Senate Returning S. 742 Without Approval,June 19,
1987. 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 715 (June 29, 1987).
4. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
5. Throughout this Current Topic the terms advocacy, editorial, and issue adver-
tisements or ads are used interchangeably to refer to advertisements concerning public
or political issues, excluding those for or against the election of particular candidates.
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nents of the opinions that are expressed, who may have neither the
resources to buy time for counter-advertisements nor the clout to
get such ads accepted by station owners, no longer have the right
protected by the Fairness Doctrine to require a station to give air-
time to their points of view. A broadcast licensee also can refuse to
run editorial advertisements altogether and confine itself to noncon-
troversial coverage of news and political issues.
This Current Topic recommends an alternative approach to the
regulation of editorial advertising on television and radio, one that
places the right of the public to be informed on an equal footing
with the right of broadcasters to determine the content of their
speech. Implemented through a statutory requirement that stations
accept a predetermined amount of such advertising at affordable
rates, this proposal would maximize the amount of political informa-
tion provided to the public while minimizing intrusion into the edi-
torial discretion of licensees. Such a limited right of access, provided
for political ideas rather than for individual speakers, is consistent
with previous Supreme Court decisions, recent congressional deter-
minations, and long-held constitutional ideals. Shifting the right of
access from the speaker's right to use the medium to the public's
right to be informed would restore the order of first amendment
values in broadcasting to that previously established by Congress
and the courts.
The concept of broadcast access is not a new one. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, legal commentators argued that groups and
individuals should have the right to purchase airtime to "advertise"
their views on television and radio. 6 The Democratic National Com-
mittee and a group called Business Executives' Move for Vietnam
Peace pursued this theory of a right of access for individuals as far as
the Supreme Court, after various broadcast licensees and networks
refused to sell them commercial time. The Court, however, upheld
broadcasters' right to reject such ads in CBS v. DNC. 7 The Court
6. The most influential of these arguments appeared in Barron, Access to the Press:
A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967).
7. In CBS v. DNC, the Democratic National Committee requested a declaratory rul-
ing from the FCC that the Communications Act of 1973 and the first amendment pre-
cluded a broadcast licensee from refusing to sell time to "responsible entities" to
present their views on public issues. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace filed
an FCC complaint alleging that a particular broadcaster had violated the first amend-
ment by refusing to sell it spots to air its views on the Vietnam War. The FCC ruled that
a broadcaster was not prohibited from having a policy refusing to accept paid issue ads
from individuals and organizations. The Court of Appeals reversed the FCC, finding
that where other sorts of paid advertisements are accepted, a flat ban on paid public




reasoned that the editorial discretion accorded broadcasters in the
regulatory scheme established by Congress in the Communications
Act of 19348 and administered by the FCC through the Fairness
Doctrine justified networks and licensees in totally banning such ad-
vocacy ads from the air.
During the 15 years since CBS v. DNC, however, shortcomings in
the system of broadcaster-determined access for issue advertising
have been evident.9 Groups and individuals have been able to buy
time from some independent stations and network affiliates but not
others; some ads on public issues have been accepted by the net-
works while others have been refused. The prospects for editorial
ad access under the current regulatory regime are no better. In the
absence of the Fairness Doctrine obligation to present a range of
viewpoints, licensees have little reason to do so of their own initia-
tive and considerable incentive not to do so.' 0 The viewpoint access
that is made available will probably be only for the affluent."I
Yet, exposure to a wide spectrum of political ideas is integral to
political decisionmaking in a democracy. As the Supreme Court has
observed, the first amendment "rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."' 2 Reach-
ing 98% of the households in the United States,' 3 the broadcast
media play a singular role in conveying political ideas. Congress has
recognized this unique role in the Communications Act requirement
that licensees serve "the public convenience, interest, and neces-
sity."' 4 Section 312(a)(7), which mandates that "reasonable access"
to the airwaves be provided to federal candidates,' 5 further demon-
FCC to develop regulations governing which editorial ads would be aired and in what
numbers. The Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals, and held that neither the
Communications Act nor the first amendment required broadcasters to accept paid edi-
torial advertisements. 412 U.S. 94.
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1986).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 111-13.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 114-19.
11. See Sethi, Beyond the Fairness Doctrine: A New War on Corporate "Propa-
ganda," N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1986, § 3, at 3.
12. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
13. U.S. Bur. of the Census, Statistical Abstract, Census of Housing 531 (1987)
(1986 figure).
14. This statutory standard covering the grant and renewal of licenses is commonly
known as the "public interest standard." 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1982).
15. Congress specifically expanded the political broadcasting responsibilities of
licensees in 1972 when it passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act (Pub. L. No. 92-
225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)), which amended the Communications Act to require broadcasters
to sell, or provide free, reasonable amounts of time to federal candidates in order to
"give candidates for public office greater access to the media so that they may better
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strates Congress' awareness of the media's function in a representa-
tive democracy. A principled basis for upholding a limited right of
access for candidates' advertising, which the Court did in CBS v.
FCC, 16 while denying a limited right of access for political issue ad-
vertisements is difficult to discern.
The editorial ad statute proposed in this Current Topic' 7 is
modeled on the provisions of the Communications Act that provide
reasonable access' 8 and low ad rates' 9 for candidates for political
office. 20 Like the candidate access provisions, the proposed edito-
rial advertising scheme requires a negligible amount of government
interference with broadcasters' and political advertisers' speech.
The statute is premised on the assumption that the expression of
more political viewpoints through the broadcast media is a good
thing in and of itself. Thus, it does not require that the identity of
the speakers or the content of their messages be controlled, except
to the extent necessary to ensure that the greatest number of voices
are heard. Nor will broadcasters' speech be monitored; their only
obligation will be to regulate the frequency with which ads appear, a
explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the
voters." S. Rep. No. 92-96, 20 (1971) (Report of the Senate Commerce Committee) cited
in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 379 (1981).
16. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
17. Statutory regimes for editorial advertising access have been discussed by previ-
ous commentators. The statutes considered had different parameters than the one pro-
posed below; it was presumed that they would work in tandem with the now-moribund
Fairness Doctrine, and the conclusions drawn about their likely success differed from
those advanced here. See Maeder, Right of Access to the Broadcast Media for Paid Edi-
torial Advertising-A Plea to Congress, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 258 (1974); Lee, The
Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcasting for Noncommercial Expression: Con-
tent Discrimination, Appellate Review, and Separation of Commercial and Noncommer-
cial Expression, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 348 (1982).
18. The Communications Act authorizes the Commission to revoke a broadcaster's
license "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally
qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)( 7 ) (1986).
19. Section 315(b)(1) provides that during a specified period before a primary or
general election, a broadcast station is not permitted to charge a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office a fee in excess of its lowest unit charge for the same class and
amount of time for the same period. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1) (1986).
20. An access proposal for noncommercial expression based on the reasonable ac-
cess rules was criticized in Lee, supra note 17. The author concluded that it would be
unconstitutional for the government to advance only political speech or political speak-
ers on the airwaves. This conclusion runs contrary to the Supreme Court's holding that
a congressionally mandated right of access to the broadcast media for federal candidates
was permissible in CBS v. FCC, and its subsequent limited public forum holdings in Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 948 (1983) (a school district may
restrict access to teachers' mail boxes to a single bargaining representative) and Corne-
lius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (federal charity
drive may exclude general category of political advocacy and legal defense groups).
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task for which stations and networks are well equipped.2 1 As a re-
sult, this statute would meet the twin goals articulated by Congress
and the Court. It would provide the public additional access to
political ideas 22 while maintaining a maximum measure ofjournalis-
tic independence for broadcasters.
2 3
I. The History of Broadcast Access in the Courts
The Supreme Court's rulings on access to the broadcast media
reflect a continuing concern with the difficulty of balancing individ-
ual and collective first amendment values. As a result, various val-
ues appear to take precedence from case to case. For example, in
Red Lion,24 the Court's first consideration of broadcast access, the
right asserted was for individuals personally attacked on the air and
for the opponents of candidates endorsed in broadcast editorials.
The Court underscored both the public's right "to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and exper-
iences," 25 and the obligation of the licensee to present "views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves." 2 6 Four years
later, however, when the Court in CBS v. DNC considered a more
generalized right of access for individuals wishing to express polit-
ical views, it placed primary importance on the rights of broadcast-
ers and on congressional intent, evinced in the Communications
Act, "to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widestjour-
21. Licensees and networks already schedule thousands of commercial messages an-
nually and review them for content, which this statute would not require. In addition,
under § 315 of the Communications Act, licensees are required to provide equal oppor-
tunities to all candidates for a public office once the station has permitted one such
candidate to buy time or appear on a non-exempted program. The political broadcast-
ing statute "operates with a type of mathematical certainty not usually found in broad-
cast regulation." H. Zuckman & M. Gaynes, Mass Communications Law 389 (2d ed.
1983).
22. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
23. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 110.
24. 395 U.S. 367. In Red Lion, the Court upheld the FCC's Fairness Doctrine, as well
as FCC-mandated rights of access for individuals attacked on the air or candidates op-
posed in station editorials. Justice White's opinion for a unanimous Court found that a
limited right of access would "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and
press." 395 U.S. at 375. He emphasized the "scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Gov-
ernment's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable
without government assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of
their views." 395 U.S. at 400. In response to broadcasters' first amendment arguments,
Justice White stressed the speech interests of the public and noted that dissimilarities in
the characteristics of different media justified the application of varying first amendment
standards. 395 U.S. at 386.
25. 395 U.S. at 390.
26. 395 U.S. at 389.
453
Yale Law & Policy Review
nalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations." 27 Then, in
1981, the Court again emphasized the public's right to be informed
by holding that a limited access requirement for federal candidates
did not unduly circumscribe the editorial discretion of broadcast
licensees. In that case, CBS v. FCC,28 the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the delicate balance between competing first amendment
interests, described in CBS v. DNC, was disrupted by recognition of
a limited right of access. The Court reiterated the Red Lion argu-
ment that the government could require a licensee to share his or
her frequency with others without running afoul of the first
amendment.
29
In CBS v. DNC the Court put forth a number of specific arguments
against a first-come, first-served access scheme for issue advertise-
ments. Objections included: (1) the danger that such ads would be
monopolized by the affluent 30 or by those of one particular political
persuasion;3' (2) that there would be further erosion of broadcaster
discretion; 32 (3) that individual speakers would not be accountable
to the public in the way licensees are; 33 and (4) that there would be
enlargement of government control over the content of public is-
sues.3 4 There are three reasons, however, why a contemporary con-
sideration of the issue in the context of a limited right of access
created within the Communications Act might well result in the
Court striking a different balance.
First and foremost is that the CBS v. DNC decision was made with
the operation of the Fairness Doctrine as a backdrop. "Of particular
importance in light of Congress' flat refusal to impose a 'common
carrier' right of access for all persons wishing to speak out on public
27. 412 U.S. at 110.
28. 453 U.S. 367 (1981). Here the Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
FCC had properly construed § 312(a)(7) in finding that the major networks' refusal to
sell President Carter 30 minutes of airtime in December 1979 violated their obligation
to provide federal candidates reasonable access. In a six-to-three decision, the Court
found that this provision, which was added by the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, had created a major new right of access and had enlarged the political broadcast-
ing responsibilities of licensees. Justice Burger's majority opinion also held that the
FCC's interpretation of the provision did not violate the broadcasters' first amendment
rights and that the FCC's standards requiring broadcasters to evaluate candidate re-
quests for time on an individual basis were warranted. In addition, the Court upheld the
Commission's authority to determine when a campaign has begun and when § 312(a)(7)
obligations apply.
29. 453 U.S. at 395, citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 389.
30. 412 U.S. at 123-4.
31. 412 U.S. at 123.
32. 412 U.S. at 126-7.
33. 412 U.S. at 125.




issues," the Court observed, "is the Commission's 'Fairness Doc-
trine' . . . . , The broadcaster was allowed significant discretion in
deciding how best to fulfill Fairness Doctrine obligations, the Court
continued, although that discretion was bounded by FCC rules.
36
The Doctrine and its component rules are no longer operational,
however, and, while a general obligation to cover public issues is
contained within section 315(a) of the Communications Act,37 it was
the Fairness Doctrine that made this obligation enforceable. Dis-
cussing the candidate equal time provisions of this section, Justice
White noted in Red Lion, "[t]he objectives of § 315 could readily be
circumvented but for the complementary fairness doctrine ratified
by § 315."38
The CBS v. DNC Court also noted that a policy requiring licen-
sees to accept editorial advertisements could place the operation of
the Fairness Doctrine in jeopardy. 39 To guarantee balanced treat-
ment, broadcasters might have to make regular programming time
available to opposing viewpoints, which would erode their editorial
discretion. If broadcasters were relieved of their Fairness Doctrine
obligations for purposes of editorial advertising, the Court contin-
ued, then the congressional objective of balanced coverage would
be threatened.
35. 412 U.S. at 110.
36. 412 U.S. at 111.
37. "Nothing in the foregoing sentence [which refers to coverage of candidates]
shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of
newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news
events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the
public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1986).
In 1986, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals determined that this language did not
make the Fairness Doctrine a binding statutory obligation. See Telecommunications Re-
search and Action Center (TRAC) v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
38. 395 U.S. at 382. Justice White went on to explain how a broadcaster could ban
all appearances by candidates and give air time only to the supporters of one slate. The
station would thus be able to have an impact on the election without incurring an obliga-
tion to give time to candidates from the opposing slate.
Similarly, unless the public interest standard of the Communications Act is inter-
preted by Congress or the FCC as requiring coverage of controversial issues of public
concern, a licensee can simply cover those public issues that are not controversial, con-
sider only one side of those that are, or ignore public issues altogether.
In the area of candidate access, Congress eliminated the possibility that licensees
might try to circumvent the reasonable access provisions by amending the Communica-
tions Act to require stations to grant federal candidates "reasonable" free or paid access.
See supra note 15. An editorial access statute would operate in much the same way to
guarantee that controversial viewpoints could not be excluded completely from the
airwaves.
39. 412 U.S. at 123-24.
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The operation of the Fairness Doctrine is no longer an issue, nor
presumably is Congress' interest in balanced presentations. A lim-
ited right of access for political information can be implemented, in
any case, without curtailing broadcasters' discretion over their own
programming. Moreover, it can mitigate the imbalance concern in
two ways: by limiting the frequency with which any one viewpoint
can be expressed and by creating a rate structure that will increase
the number of groups and individuals who can afford to buy time for
opposition ads.
Although the CBS v. DNC Court determined that neither the stat-
ute nor the Constitution mandated a general right of access for indi-
viduals, it did not reach "the question of whether the First
Amendment or the Act can be read to preclude the Commission
from determining that in some situations the public interest re-
quires licensees to re-examine their policies with respect to editorial
advertisements."-40 The Court noted that the judgment of the legis-
lative branch on the question of access could not be undervalued,
even though broadcasters' first amendment claims were at issue.
4'
The Court added in a later passage, "Conceivably at some future
date Congress or the Commission-or the broadcasters-may de-
vise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and
desirable."
42
Finally, the Court's CBS v. FCC decision, upholding a congress-
ionally created right of access for federal candidates, seems contrary
to its earlier refusal in CBS v. DNC to recognize access rights for
organized political parties. The Democratic National Committee
had urged the Court in CBS v. DNC at least to recognize a right for
national political parties to purchase airtime to discuss public issues,
but the Court refused. "We see no principal [sic] means under. the
First Amendment of favoring access by organized political parties
over groups and individuals,"-43 the Court stated.
The principled distinction that the Court later recognized when it
upheld access rights for political candidates after rejecting similar
access rights for political groups seems based on the difference be-
40. 412 U.S. at 119.
41. 412 U.S. at 103. It is important to note that if the statute recommended here
were considered by the Court today, it would probably face FCC opposition. The Court
makes no reference in any of the three access cases as to how a split in the judgments of
the legislative and executive branch would effect its deliberations. Presumably, it would
rely on its determination of whether the factual predicate for regulation exists. This is
discussed in more detail in the following section.
42. 412 U.S. at 131.




tween particular obligations that attach when special rights are ar-
ticulated by the legislature and the more limited duty that attaches
to general goals expressed by Congress. The candidates' right was
a specific one created when Congress amended the Communica-
tions Act to include section 312(a)(7) while the right claimed by the
Democratic Party was a general one stemming only from the public
interest standard of the Communications Act. Thus, a specific ac-
cess right such as that proposed in this Current Topic, grounded in
the public interest standard and affirmed through amendment of the
Communications Act, would be upheld by the Court.
IL The Rationale for Regulation
The legitimacy of any scheme of broadcast access regulation
hinges on the permissibility of regulating the broadcast media in a
manner that would not pass constitutional muster if applied to
print.44 As the FCC observed in 1969, "[b]roadcasting is press and
something more. . .. -45 The varying definitions of that "something
more" account for broadcasting's unique treatment in the first
amendment context.
A. The Traditional Justification and Its Critics
Specifically, Congress and the courts have based the anomalous
treatment of broadcasting on the assumption that it differs from
other media in three significant ways: (1) broadcasting uses the in-
herently scarce electromagnetic spectrum; (2) broadcasting involves
public trusteeship, rather than individual ownership of this valuable
public resource; and (3) broadcasting has singular perceptual im-
pact and pervasiveness. The third justification is particularly applica-
ble to television, with its simultaneous audio and visual
transmission, its presence in virtually all American homes, and the
average national viewing pattern of seven hours a day.
4 6
44. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
45. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. (WBBM-TV), 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 131-32 (1969),
quoted in A. Shapiro, Media Access 17 (1976).
46. The average American household watched TV for 53 hours, 11 minutes each
week (7 hours, 36 minutes a day) duringJanuary, February, and March of 1987. Homes
with pay cable watched about an hour more per day. Thirty-four hours, thirty-eight min-
utes were spent watching the three major networks during an average week. TV View-
ing Drops by Six Minutes a Day, TV Guide, May 14, 1987, at A-141.
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Broadcasters, legal observers, and the FCC have raised questions
about the continuing vitality of these distinctions.4 7 Their critique is
based first on the idea that scarcity no longer exists in the electronic
media due to improved use of the electromagnetic spectrum and
development of alternative technologies such as cable, low-power
television (LPTV), and direct broadcast satellites (DBS). 48 Second,
they argue that the public trustee system is not necessary and the
public would be better served if broadcasting was regulated by the
market.49 Finally, critics rely on the premise that even if broadcast is
more pervasive and has a greater impact than print, effectiveness of
a means of communication is not a legitimate justification for its
regulation.
50
This assessment of the current broadcast market is not held unan-
imously, however. 5' It is significant that Congress does not concur
in the FCC's determination that scarcity, and the need for regula-
tion, are gone. Nor does Congress agree that the licensee/trustee
system is less effective than the unregulated marketplace in meeting
the public interest. Last spring, in the report that accompanied S.
742,52 the bill that would have codified the Fairness Doctrine,53 the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation con-
47. See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regula-
tion, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207 (1982), reprinted in 4 Mass Communication Review Yearbook
645 (E. Wartella, D. Whitney & S. Windahl eds. 1983).
48. Id. at 221-26, 659-68.
49. Id. The repeal of the Fairness Doctrine was premised on the fact that the public
now has access to a multitude of viewpoints due to the explosive growth in the number
of information sources in the marketplace and on the fact that the Doctrine "chill[ed]"
speech and impeded the coverage of controversial issues. Inquiry into Section 73.1910
of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine
Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 169 (1985) [hereinafter Fairness
Doctrine Inquiry].
50. "[T]he deficiencies of the scarcity rationale have led some to think that it is the
immediacy and power of broadcasting that causes its differential treatment.... [W]e are
unwilling to endorse an argument that makes the very effectiveness of speech the justifi-
cation for according it less first amendment protection." TRAC v. FCC, 801 F.2d at 508.
51. Belief in the existence of spectrum scarcity, and belief in the ability of the market
to better provide for media consumers, are in many ways matters of faith. Proponents of
each position gather a wealth of statistical information and wind up drawing diametri-
cally different conclusions. See infra text accompanying notes 52-59.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court noted that new technologies might render the
scarcity doctrine obsolete, but declined to reconsider its long-standing approach to
broadcast regulation "without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological
developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regu-
lation may be required." FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n. 11
(1984).
52. Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, Report on S. 742, Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, S. Rep. No. 34, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
[hereinafter Fairness Act Report].




cluded that the FCC's Fairness Doctrine findings were "factually
flawed," "based on erroneous legal analysis," and "entitled to no
deference." 54 The Committee based its conclusions on its findings
that the electromagnetic spectrum remains scarce relative to de-
mand, that the number of broadcast channels is limited (despite the
introduction of new audio and video services), and that Congress
has permissibly chosen a system whereby a select few are licensed to
use the spectrum in return for a commitment to operate in the pub-
lic interest. 55 Moreover, to prevent interference among users, the
government is still required to allocate spectrum frequencies. The
government must still make choices about competing uses of the
spectrum, the report noted, pointing to recent battles between the
cellular radio industry and public safety officials, the direct broad-
cast satellite industry and fixed microwave service users, and the
proponents of high-definition television (HDTV) and land mobile
service providers.
56
In the Committee's view, growth in the number of broadcast sta-
tions does not undercut the scarcity argument because "as long as
more people seek licenses to use the spectrum than can be accom-
modated, there is scarcity." 57 The same cannot be said of newspa-
pers, the report added. The only bar to start-up and profitable
existence of a daily newspaper in many markets is economic, while
physical scarcity-the unavailability of room on the spectrum--can
prevent even someone with unlimited resources from starting a tele-
vision station. 5
8
The third rationale for the anomalous treatment of broadcasting,
that the medium is uniquely pervasive and even invasive,5 9 is one
relied on explicitly by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
54. Fairness Act Report, supra note 52, at 4.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 20-22.
57. Id. at 23.
58. The Fairness Act Report pointed to the example of the Washington Times, a
newspaper that was able to begin operation in the Washington, D.C., area in the early
1980s, although no open broadcast frequencies exist in the same market. Id. at 25.
59. The FCC argued recently that the impact rationale is a part of the scarcity doc-
trine. "Implicit in the 'scarcity' rationale is an assumption that broadcasters.., possess
a power to communicate ideas through sound and visual images in a manner that is
significantly different from traditional avenues of communication because of the imme-
diacy of the medium." 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1324, cited in TRAC v. FCC, 801 F.2d at
508.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's view, however, arguing that "the Supreme
Court's articulation of the scarcity doctrine contains no hint of any immediacy ration-
ale." 801 F.2d at 508.
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tion,60 and implicitly in its discussion of the "captive" broadcast au-
dience in CBS v. DNC and other cases. 61 This rationale is largely
based on the perception that broadcasting is somehow different from
print, a difference that has been resistant to empirical measure-
ment. 62 Yet, regulation still can recognize broadcasting's unique
impact-even if that uniqueness cannot be measured-without at-
tempting to moderate its effectiveness. An editorial ad access plan,
in particular, would take advantage of the potency of television and
radio for the benefit of political speakers and the public, without
constraining their effectiveness in delivering broadcasters' speech.
The Supreme Court, for its part, has never been wary of recogniz-
ing differences among forms of communication and judging media
regulation accordingly. The Red Lion Court, for example, observed
that "[d]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differ-
ences in the First Amendment standards applied to them." 63 In an
earlier case, Justice Jackson argued that "[t]he moving picture
screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck, the
60. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In upholding the Commission's power to regulate broad-
casts that are indecent but not obscene, Justice Stevens wrote in a plurality opinion, "of
all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection .... [The] reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two
have relevance to the present case. First the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans .. " 438 U.S. at 748.
61. The DNC Court described the courts' concern with this characteristic of broad-
casting in several cases, including Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)
(radio broadcasts are permissible on municipal buses), and Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) (FCC has power to promulgate
regulations regarding cigarette advertising). The DNC Court quoted Judge Bazelon's
opinion in Banzhaf 405 F.2d at 1100-01:
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and reading requires
an affirmative act. Broadcasting messages, by contrast, are 'in the air'. . . . It is diffi-
cult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be
heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater than the
impact of the written word.
412 U.S. at 128.
62. Laurence Tribe's assessment is representative:
Almost as difficult as conceiving of cumulative trends is imagining the effects of
scale. Barely 100,000 television receivers were in use in the United States in 1948.
In the next year there were a million. A decade later there were 50 million. The
social and psychological consequences of phenomenal growth are hard even to con-
template, let alone predict. Indeed, in the case of television these effects are still a
matter of debate, and apparently adequate research tools for measuring or evaluat-
ing them do not yet exist.
L. Tribe, Channeling Technology Through Law 29 (1973).




street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses, and dan-
gers. Each ... is a law unto itself. ... 64
B. Distinctions In the Use of Broadcast and Other Media
From the perspective of conveying political information, broad-
casting and print are very different. 65 For example, even though
most viewers spend only 15% of their television time watching
newscasts, 66 two-thirds of all Americans claim to receive most of
their news from television.67 The trend toward television as the pri-
mary source of news has accelerated since 1980; 50% of those asked
in a nationwide poll conducted in 1986 said television was their only
source of news compared to 39% answering the question in 1980.68
More than twice as many people polled in 1986 said that they would
trust a report they heard on television than would trust a conflicting
item in a newspaper. 69 Eighty-four percent of those contacted in a
TV Guide/Opinion Research Corporation poll in September and
October of 1987 said that their choice for president will be influ-
enced by how the candidates perform in televised debates.70 Voter
polls taken two to three days before various primaries this year sug-
64. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson,J., concurring) (state interest
in privacy justifies prohibition of sound trucks operating at a loud and raucous volume).
Thus, films can be subjected to a degree of prior review that would be unthinkable if
applied to books, and otherwise protected speech that is indecent, but not obscene, can
be regulated on the airwaves. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (system of
prior submission permissible for motion pictures if it contains adequate procedural safe-
guards); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (state juvenile delinquency com-
mission's informal recommendations to book distributors represent unconstitutional
censorship); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (civil sanctions can be imposed
on a broadcaster for airing patently offensive monologue).
65. [I]nformation is conveyed far more vividly by television's combination of
words, voices, and pictures than by the faceless and voiceless words of newspapers.
Perhaps that explains why most Americans consume more political news from tele-
vision than from newspapers and why they rely more on the accuracy of what they
see on television than on what they read in the newspapers. In any event, television
newscasts and public affairs programs unquestionably constitute the major source
of political reality for most Americans.
A. Ranney, Channels of Power, The Impact of Television on American Politics 16
(1983).
66. Television Dimensions '88, at 158 (E. Patazian ed. 1988). This figure includes
cable services.
67. Television Information Office/Roper Organization, America's Watching: Public
Attitudes Toward Television 18 (1987) (survey conducted in Dec. 1986).
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 18.
70. Lipton, Campaign '88 and TV: America Speaks Out, TV Guide, Jan. 23-29,
1988, at 3.
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gest that last-minute television advertising by candidates can have
an impact on viewers as well.
7'
Differences in the ways that broadcasting and other media are re-
lied upon by citizens in gathering information to make political deci-
sions bear on arguments that newer technologies have rendered
broadcast regulation obsolete. The first concern raised by the even-
tual replacement of television and radio by new audiovisual technol-
ogy is availability. At present television is the only medium available
to virtually the entire population at no direct cost.72 Projections of
the ultimate increase in alternative electronic media, by contrast, are
for much less than 90-plus percent availability. Currently, use of
these technologies hovers at about 44% of all American homes for
cable, 0.63% for multipoint distribution systems, and 0.19% for sat-
ellite master antenna systems (SMATV). 73 There are some 428 low-
power television stations, each with a reach about one-tenth the size
of a typical television service area.74 Direct broadcast satellite ser-
vice and multichannel multipoint distribution systems are not yet on
the market. 7
5
Even if these alternatives become available to the majority of the
population, their affordability may pose an obstacle to widespread
use.76 Political scientist Christopher Arterton warned a House com-
mittee in 1983 that the diffusion of new communications technolo-
71. Earlier this year, a New York Times/CBS News Poll indicated that television
commercials helped produce "dramatic shifts" in voter sentiments in the last days of the
February 1988 Super Tuesday primaries campaign. O'Neill, Let Surrogate Candidates
Smile for TV, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at A31. This finding corresponds to that of
Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure in the 1972 elections that individuals gained
considerable issue information from political advertising. T. Patterson & R. McClure,
The Unseeing Eye 23 (1976).
72. One network executive observed that the development of new programming
technologies merely "underscore[s] the singular role of network television-which re-
mains our only true mass medium-as the only shared experience that crosses over all
the differences that characterize this vast and varied nation." Speech by John Severino,
ABC, to Arizona Broadcasters Ass'n, Nov. 11, 1984, at 2, cited in Ferris & Kirkland, Fair-
ness-The Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 Cath. Univ. L. Rev. 605, 611 (1985).
Paul Starr has noted that a broadcast television program is a public good in an eco-
nomic sense because, "one person's consumption does not preclude another's; and ex-
cluding anyone from consumption is costly, if not impossible." Starr, The Meaning of
Privatization, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 6, 15 (1988).
73. Fairness Act Report, supra note 52, at 24.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. At a recent Congressional hearing, Senator Howard Metzenbaum displayed a list
of 93 markets where basic cable rates have increased more than 50% since Congress
deregulated rates in 1987. The National Association of Attorneys General has also be-
gun a probe of anticompetitive practices by cable operators: raising prices and dropping
channels. "This has really hurt people on fixed incomes," says task force leader Charles




gies could exacerbate social class differences in the receipt of
political information:
These differences are already clearly present; my concern is that they
will be intensified as communications media evolve .... Many of the
newer media will probably carry specialized messages to particular
audiences. For some, these channels will produce a rich abundance of
information about politics. In the process, however, the general audi-
ence may be given less exposure to political information.
77
Political scientist Benjamin Ginsberg has noted that evidence indi-
cates that "[a]mong lower-class viewers and readers, political atti-
tudes and extent of media use are highly correlated," 78 while for
upscale audiences, attitudes are not related to levels of media
exposure.
79
In his study of the 1976 presidential election, Thomas Patterson
discovered that television provided less-informed citizens of low and
moderate interest with information that they did not gain elsewhere.
This finding, he noted, confirmed previous studies.80 Patterson's
earlier study with James McClure of the 1972 election revealed that
voters gained considerable candidate issue information from polit-
ical advertising on television-particularly voters at low education
and income levels.8i The evolution of a segmented communications
marketplace could halt this pattern of efficient information dissemi-
nation.8 2 Pay alternatives could create a stratification between the
higher-income, politically literate, who can afford to buy targeted
media featuring public affairs programming, and the lower-income,
77. Broadcast Media in Elections: Hearing Before the Task Force on Elections of the
Comm. on House Administration and the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Con-
sumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 89-90 (1983) (testimony of Dr. Christopher Arterton, Department of
Political Science, Yale University) [hereinafter Broadcast Media in Elections]. See also C.
Arterton, Teledemocracy: Can Technology Protect Democracy 203 (1987); Elliott, Intel-
lectuals, the "Information Society" and the Disappearance of the Public Sphere, in 4
Mass Communication Review Yearbook, supra note 47, at 569.
78. B. Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power 146
(1986).
79. Id. at 146-47.
80. Interestingly, the major source of this information was not evening newscasts
but television's special broadcasts, such as conventions and debates. T. Patterson, The
Mass Media Election 165, 192 n.8 (1980).
81. "In fact, during the short period of the general election campaign, presidential
ads contain substantially more issue content than network newscasts. This information is
particularly valuable to people who pay little attention to the newspaper. Advertising
serves to make these poorly informed people substantially more knowledgeable." T.
Patterson & R. McClure, supra note 71, at 129.
82. Broadcast technology "supplants atomized, relatively informal communication
with mass media as a prime source of national cohesion and news .... Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 386 n.15.
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politically illiterate, who will only be able to afford entertainment-
oriented, commercial advertiser-supported television.
The ultimate availability of a multitude of channels at affordable
rates may not mean an increase in the diversity of the marketplace
for political ideas if all the channels remain in a few hands. Concen-
tration of broadcasting power was a major concern of the drafters of
the Communications Act.83 Historically, concentration has enabled
broadcasters to limit the dissemination of messages with which they
did not agree. 84 While FCC regulations prohibit single ownership
of both a daily newspaper and a television station in the same com-
munity, the FCC has few structural regulations affecting ownership
of other media. By 1981, 38% of the cable systems were owned by
television companies and another 25% "by publishing firms. 85 The
movement in the cable industry to integrate vertically by owning
both programming and franchises only exacerbates the likelihood
that programming geared to small audiences will have trouble find-
ing an outlet.8 6 Furthermore, even structural mechanisms that suc-
cessfully ensure diversity of ownership in the media marketplace
cannot ensure diversity of viewpoints, if most in the industry share
the same values and commitment to the preservation of the
system.
8 7
Even if a wide variety of opinion outlets eventually develops, pub-
lic debate may be constrained rather than enhanced. The relegation
of controversial viewpoints to channels with small audience reach
combined with audiences' propensity to choose, or at least to pay
more attention to, information with which they agree might insulate
viewers from exposure to new opinions. Communications research
suggests that audiences select information that reinforces their be-
liefs and interests to some extent. Democrats, for example, are more
attentive to news of their own primaries, Republicans, to news of
their party representatives. 88 By contrast, the metaphor of truth
83. See F. Rowan, Broadcast Fairness: Doctrine, Practice, Prospects 27-32 (1984).
84. See I. Pool, Technologies of Freedom 119-129 (1983) for a discussion of private
radio censorship of political and other speakers and of government attempts to influ-
ence broadcast content in the 1920s and 1930s.
85. Id. at 49-51.
86. For example, in 1986 the New York Citizens Committee on Cable Television
filed suit against Manhattan Cable Television, charging the company with illegally deny-
ing some pay-television services access to its system. In March 1988 the suit was settled
when Manhattan Cable agreed to add two or more pay movie services within the next
year. See Is Cable Cornering the Market?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1988, § 3, at 12.
87. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Carter, Technology, Democ-
racy, and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 Yale L.J. 581, 600 n. 107 (1984).




winning out in the marketplace of ideas suggests an exchange of
views, a lively debate. The vision of the Socialists watching their
cable channel, the Libertarians their satellite broadcast, and the In-
dependents their low-power television programs casts some doubt
on the promise that myriad outlets will result in a multitude of ideas
being shared. Everything important may get said, but no one im-
portant-i.e., the uninformed or undecided-may be listening.
III. The Constitutional Questions
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that "[i]t is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee."8 9 The Congress has found
that scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum continues and that,
where and when new video and audio services are available, they do
not provide meaningful alternatives to broadcast stations for the
dissemination of news and public affairs. 90 The question that re-
mains unanswered is whether the first amendment requires Con-
gress to remain neutral while the communications market develops
into one that provides political information only to some. Or does
the first amendment permit Congress to continue some degree of
broadcast regulation in order to ensure that at least one communi-
cations medium conveys political information from diverse sources
to the public at large?
The Supreme Court has suggested that the Congress, through the
FCC, can use the broadcast licensee system to correct imperfections
in the marketplace of ideas. "We see nothing in the First Amend-
ment to prevent the Commission from allocating licenses so as to
promote the 'public interest' in diversification of the mass communi-
cations media," the Court noted in FCC v. National Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting.91 At least one congressional committee has con-
curred, arguing recently that "the government's affirmative involve-
ment in broadcasting presents the opportunity for government to
fashion regulatory regimes creatively in order to vindicate a range of
89. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390, citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
90. Fairness Act Report, supra note 52, at 34-35.
91. 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978).
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first amendment interests left unprotected by a strict separation be-
tween government and the system of freedom of expression." 9
2
Legal theoreticians, too, suggest the permissibility of government
action to advance first amendment values. 93 To Alexander
Meiklejohn, Congress is not merely permitted to act to broaden
public debate, it has "a heavy and basic responsibility to do so."
9 4
The primary purpose of the first amendment is a public, not private,
one, aimed at guaranteeing that individuals understand the issues
that bear upon their lives as citizens. "That is why no idea, no opin-
ion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information
may be kept from them."-95 The freedom of thought needed for self-
governance can be increased by an unhindered flow of accurate in-
formation. 96 Thus, Congress can act to enlarge and enrich the free-
dom of speech and to "cultivat[e] the general intelligence upon
which the success of self-government so obviously depends."
97
More recently, Lee Bollinger of the University of Michigan Law
School has argued that Congress can act to create access rights to
the broadcast media. Even if scarcity, government licensing, and
pervasiveness do not render broadcast analytically distinct from
print, he suggests:
Congress ought still to be permitted to provide that the opportunity to
reach the television audience will not depend entirely on private own-
ership. As is true now, the government should be able in one forum to
balance the freedom of press interests of those owning established
channels of communication against the interests of those effectively
excluded from major avenues of communication.
98
Bollinger concedes that access regulations may have "adverse
consequences for the marketplace of ideas." 99 They may create a
disincentive for broadcasters to cover public issues. Access rights
also create the risk that the administrative mechanism necessary to
implement them will wind up intimidating the press into toeing an
official line. Bollinger observes that "[s]uch a regulatory structure
92. Fairness Act Report, supra note 52, at 17.
93. See generally Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 Ga. L.
Rev. 795 (1981). See also Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405,
1416 (1986) ("When the state acts to enhance the quality of public debate, we should
recognize its actions as consistent with the first amendment").
94. A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 20 (1948, rep. 1979).
95. Id. at 75.
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 39
(1976).




would stand as a constant temptation to government officials..."100
Access regulation may also have a tendency to beget more regula-
tion, a drawback which Bollinger warns should not be underesti-
mated, because once in place a regulatory scheme gone awry will be
hard to dismantle.' 0 '
Access regulation can be structured, however, to minimize the
dangers that concern Bollinger. Disincentives to broadcasters to
cover certain issues, for example, can be overcome through the cre-
ation of access schemes that are not contingent upon broadcasters'
coverage of those issues and that do not include licensee reply re-
quirements. Such schemes also contract the sphere within which the
government can make arbitrary or self-interested decisions regard-
ing broadcasters' speech. Systems that operate as mechanically as
possible minimize the grounds for viewer or would-be speaker com-
plaints. They also partially insulate broadcasters from administrative
agency intrusiveness. It is easier to measure objectively the proce-
dural fairness of a first-come, first-served system, for example, than
to judge the substantive fairness of one allowing broadcasters dis-
cretion in who speaks. The concern that access regulation is likely
to lead to expanded regulation argues for step-by-step implementa-
tion of any access proposal or for sunsetting provisions that will pre-
vent the retention of counterproductive regulations through
bureaucratic inertia.
Because access regulation is both "dangerous and desirable,"
Bollinger recommends a system of partial regulation. Only under
such a system can the citizenry risk the degree of government inter-
vention necessary to achieve the rewards of public access.' 0 2 The
partial regulatory system itself provides an effective check against
the possible cost of access regulation, Bollinger adds. If the regu-
lated broadcast media sector foregoes coverage of some issue or
event, the public will still be informed through the unregulated
print media. If government interference chills broadcasters' speech,
the unregulated print press remains free to serve as watchdog.
Once the print press has covered an issue, or criticized the govern-
ment, the pressure on the broadcast media to report that criticism
increases considerably. The result, Bollinger contends, is a "benefi-
cial tension" between the regulated and unregulated sectors-cov-
100. Id. at 31.
101. Id. at 32.
102. Id. at 32. For a contrary view, see L. Powe, American Broadcasting and the
First Amendment 6 (1987).
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erage in one serving as a competitive prod to coverage in the
other. '
0 3
IV Ad Hoc Access in Action
Once it is determined that the dissemination of diverse viewpoints
is a legitimate first amendment goal that Congress can seek to en-
sure through the broadcast media, the case for intervention in the
current licensee-governed system of editorial advertising regulation
is a strong one. Broadcasters' affirmative obligation to provide di-
verse voices from the community is gone; their incentive to do so
voluntarily is slight; and, in practice, their treatment of advocacy ad-
vertisement is inconsistent and arbitrary.
All three major commercial networks have policies precluding the
sale of time for editorial advertising during network programming
and during local programming on their owned-and-operated sta-
tions.10 4 The result is a virtual blackout for issue speakers wishing
to reach television's largest audiences; 70% of all television sets are
tuned to the three major networks during primetime. 0 5 Independ-
ent stations and network affiliates have individual policies for the
advertising time they control; they may relegate these ads to late
hours, sell them time selectively or indiscriminately, or not accept
them at all.
When the Fairness Doctrine was in operation, the airing of ads
promoting one side of a controversial question required a station to
act in one of three ways: (1) to allow a spokesperson or group with
an opposing view to buy rebuttal time; (2) to cover the opposing
side's viewpoint on news and public affairs programming; or (3) to
offer free time to a spokesperson for the opposite view.' 0 6 This sys-
tem provided broadcasters with editorial discretion to the extent
that they could choose both the initial message and the speaker to
represent the opposing view. It imposed a constraint, however, to
103. Id. at 33.
104. Telephone interviews with Harvey Dzodin, Director of Broadcast Standards
and Practices, American Broadcasting Co. (Mar. 17, 1988); George Dessart, Vice Presi-
dent Program Practices, Columbia Broadcasting Co. Broadcast Group (Mar. 17, 1988);
and Richard Gitter, Vice President Broadcast Standards, National Broadcasting Co.
(Mar. 16, 1988); Interview with Richard Gitter (Aug. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Network
Interviews].
The single exception to this network policy is an experimental program for the sale of
editorial advertisements at the NBC owned-and-operated station WRC in Washington,
D.C.
105. R. Heath & R. Nelson, Issues Management: Corporate Public Policymaking in
an Information Society 233 (1986).




the extent that it obligated them to act, by locating a speaker or
speaking themselves, each and every time advocacy ad time was
sold. In addition, it required licensees to keep rough track of how
much coverage they gave to controversial points of view and during
what part of the day, and to measure that against the coverage they
gave to opposing opinions. These requirements discouraged the ac-
ceptance of editorial ads-and coverage of controversial topics alto-
gether. This "chilling effect"' 10 7 was a major rationale for the FCC's
repeal of the Fairness Doctrine.
The operation of the old regime was no more satisfactory to those
wishing to speak. Defining issues as "noncontroversial" enabled
stations to run advocacy ads without incurring a reply obligation.
0 8
Defining an ad as controversial meant exclusion from the networks
and selective treatment by local stations. Noncontroversial designa-
tions were applied inconsistently, which resulted in mixed patterns
of acceptances and rejections from ad to ad, station to station, and
market to market.' 0 9
107. The 1985 Fairness Doctrine Inquiry noted the "chilling effect" of the Fairness
Doctrine on broadcasters' speech. Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, supra note 49, at 246.
There is a difference between the "chill" a broadcaster feels because airing a particu-
lar story or viewpoint will cost him in later coverage or free time and the "chill" felt by
speakers who believe exercise of their first amendment rights will result in government
retaliation. The statute proposed herein attempts to eliminate the first cost of contro-
versial speech and to better insulate the broadcaster from government involvement than
did the former Fairness Doctrine regime, which should mitigate to some extent the pos-
sibility for punitive government action.
108. In the "Yes to Stop Callaway" matter, for example, the FCC found that a televi-
sion station did not violate the Fairness Doctrine by airing a series of some 300 30-
second spots arguing the need for a nuclear power plant then under construction with-
out airing any spots opposing the need for the plant. The FCC decided that since a
construction permit had already been granted by the time the spots aired, the licensee
did not act unreasonably in concluding that the "need" for the plant was no longer a
controversial issue of public importance. (One cannot help but wonder, however, why
anyone would purchase 300 spots to discuss an issue that was moot.) The complainant,
the Yes to Stop Callaway Committee, argued that the FCC and the station construed the
issue of controversiality too narrowly, particularly since the question of the plant's advis-
ability was to be considered again in utility rate base hearings to be held after the ads
were shown. Yes to Stop Callaway Committee, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 989 (rel. Aug. 9,
1984).
109. The experience of the W.R. Grace & Co. and its anti-deficit spots is illustrative.
In 1984, the company prepared an ad that suggested that the federal deficit would be
paid for by future generations. It aired on all three major networks. In 1985, the com-
pany prepared a follow-up spot that suggested failure to reduce the federal deficit would
lead to economic collapse. All three networks initially refused to run the spot because it
was "controversial," although many independent stations and network affiliates agreed
to run it. In newspaper op-ed pages across the country company Chairman Peter Grace
and his legal counsel Joseph Califano called the networks' enforcement of their issue
advertising policies "inconsistent and capricious," noting that the networks accepted ads
urging Americans to buy goods "Made in America," and spots produced by the Coin-
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Unfortunately, there are several reasons why the end of the Fair-
ness Doctrine's reply-time requirements is unlikely to spur broad-
casters to create an expanded forum for opinion. The three major
networks have retained their blanket bans, claiming a preference for
covering such subject matter in their news and public affairs pro-
gramming."l 0 Left unsaid is the fear that viewpoint ads might not
provide an ideal environment for the broadcast of their commercial
counterparts; they might be too negative, too inflammatory, and so
forth. The broadcasting industry is in the business of selling audi-
ences to advertisers, audiences with a proclivity for buying a spon-
sor's product, and any advertising that might offend and possibly
diminish that audience is not likely to be actively encouraged."'
As for the likelihood of expanded licensee coverage of controver-
sial issues in regular news and public affairs programming-as those
who supported the end of the Fairness Doctrine projected-such a
likelihood is similarly minimized by the growing commercialization
of such programming and its consequent need to remain noncon-
troversial to maximize audience size. In its early years television
news was considered a "loss leader," provided more for station
prestige than for profit. But by the 1970s, news programs had
demonstrated an ability to make money. News divisions at the net-
works recently have entered a period of intense competition, during
which the distinctions between news and commercial programming
have grown less clear,' 12 and pressures to remain noncontroversial
to attract the largest audiences possible have increased. Escalating
costs of news production and cuts in network news budgets are ad-
mittee for Energy Awareness promoting coal and nuclear power. Networks vs. Free
Speech, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at A31.
Eventually CBS agreed to air the advertisement after support for the balanced budget
amendment was deleted. CBS Agrees to Air "Issue Ad" Depicting Deficit Trial, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 20, 1986, at 3.
110. Network Interviews, supra note 104.
111. In his dissent in CBS v. DNC, Justice Brennan noted that "angry customers are
not good customers and, in the commercial world of mass communications it is simply
'bad business' to espouse-or even to allow others to espouse-the heterodox or con-
troversial." 412 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Jaffe, The Editorial Re-
sponsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev.
768, 773 n.26 (1972) (there is a considerable possibility that the broadcaster will engage
in self-censorship and avoid as much controversy as he can); Barron, supra note 6, at
1646 (the mass media harbors "antipathy" to unorthodox ideas).
112. Hallin, We Keep America on Top of the World, in Watching Television 24-25




ditional reasons to anticipate that any new public affairs offerings
will be aimed at attracting mass, rather than targeted, audiences."
l3
In general, newspapers and periodicals can afford to provide
more diverse material than television programmers. Because of the
self-selection a reader makes, publishers can sell their entire prod-
uct to individuals who want particular articles and will ignore others.
By contrast, listeners and viewers-at least those without videocas-
sette recorders-must often watch a news broadcast in its entirety to
see a segment in which they are interested, or they must make a
decision among stations as to which one is likely to provide the pro-
gram with the greatest number of interesting segments. 1 4 Broad-
casters cannot take a chance that any one item will lead a viewer to
reject the rest of the broadcast or forego the program in the future.
Individual newspapers and magazines differ from broadcast tele-
vision, too, in the fact that they are generally supported through a
combination of advertiser and reader payments. The reader contri-
bution to revenues enables them to reflect the interests of readers
with strong preferences to a degree that over-the-air television can-
not due to the absence of viewer-supported markets." l 5
V Implementing a Right of Access for Issue Advertisements
The structure of the broadcast industry does not encourage the
airing of diverse views. Nor is the general public interest require-
113. The news divisions of the three major networks, for example, suffered hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in cuts in 1986. Diamond, The Big Chill, New York Maga-
zine, Aug. 11, 1986, at 22.
Even if television stations continue to produce the same amount of information pro-
gramming, it could be argued that it would be insufficient to inform the public. The
average is 340 minutes a day of national and local news or approximately 11 half-hours
each day. When set into newspaper type, a 30-minute national news script is the
equivalent of less than two columns of the New York Times. Ranney, supra note 65, at
46, 67. Even assuming that two columns of the Times is equivalent to an entire page of
an average newspaper, an individual watching every news program offered on an aver-
age channel in a given day would only get about II pages worth of information.
114. One commentator suggests that this difference makes the case for content reg-
ulation of daily newspapers weaker than for broadcasting---even though newspapers are
also scarce in some markets. Brennan, Economic Efficiency and Broadcast Content Reg-
ulation, 35 Fed. Comm. L.J. 117, 133 n.37 (1983).
115. Id. at 129. Thus a monthly magazine like Consumer Reports can exist solely on
subscriber revenues, while a magazine like Modern Bride contains literally hundreds of
pages of advertising, has few subscribers, and relies instead on newsstand sales of only
one or two issues to an individual consumer in a lifetime.
In the U.S. 48.3% of magazine revenues, over 75% of newspaper revenues, and
nearly all television revenues are from advertising. Figures compiled from Magazine
Publishers Assoc., 1986 Financial Survey 1, (1986); Newspaper Advertising Bureau, An-
nual Advertising Expenditures 1 (Feb. 29, 1988); Newspaper Advertising Bureau, Circu-
lation Revenue Rep't (Aug. 19 8 7);J. Servan-Schreiber, The Power To Inform 53 (1974).
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ment of the Communications Act adequate to ensure that a broad
spectrum of controversial opinions on public issues will be aired on
the broadcast media. As a consequence, greater dissemination of
political information can only be guaranteed by congressional amend-
ment of the Communications Act. An amendment requiring accept-
ance of advocacy advertising will ensure that a greater diversity of
political ideas is presented to the viewing public.
A. Statute Specifics
The statute proposed in this Current Topic includes the following
provisions: (1) advocacy advertisers will be provided "reasonable ac-
cess" to buy time for their views; (2) reasonable access for the pur-
pose of this statute is defined as a minimum of one minute every two
hours between the hours of 6 a.m. and 12 p.m.; (3) no more than
10% of the total time allotted to editorial advertising in a calendar
month will be provided to a single viewpoint on a single issue;
(4) ads are to be accepted on a first-come, first-served basis, for no
longer than one month at a time; (5) viewpoint advertisers will be
able to purchase time in the furtherance of this obligation at the
lowest available unit rate for the applicable time slot; (6) licensees
will be indemnified from libel liability for any information that ap-
pears in an issue advertisement; (7) ads that endorse or oppose
political candidates are not granted access under this statute; and
(8) ads that attack the character, honesty, integrity, or personal qual-
ities of an identifiable individual or group are not granted access
under this statute.
The 10% restriction on particular viewpoints can be enforced ad-
ministratively to minimize licensee or FCC involvement in content
evaluations by asking issue advertisers themselves to identify the is-
sue their spot is designed to address. In the event that the station
determines that the advertiser has mischaracterized the issue in or-
der to evade the 10% ad time limit, the station shall relabel the issue
involved, and the FCC will provide ultimate administrative review.
This provision should encourage the preparation of single-issue
ads-which are presumably more comprehensible in a short time
frame-since advertisers are not likely to lose their opportunity to
gain access twice by placing two issues in a single advertisement.
The 10% restriction aims to maximize the number of voices and
views aired and to preclude any one group from appearing fre-




The single-month sales period restriction is designed to prevent
wealthy groups from buying up time to run a single viewpoint
message for month after month. This operates on the assumption
that it is more interesting for viewers, and possibly even more in-
formative, to hear even similar viewpoints advocated in different
ways. Both the 10% per month frequency limitation and the single
month sales period should serve as disincentives for commercial ad-
vertisers to recast their messages to take advantage of low rates.
Sponsors are unlikely to invest the money to produce an ad that can
air only a few times per month.
The provision regarding rates for editorial advertising is compa-
rable to that requiring stations that sell ads to federal candidates to
charge the lowest unit rates in the period 45 days before a primary
election and 60 days before a general election." 6 This statute
would provide licensees the same protection for libel liability as they
are now provided for candidate advertising. Under section 315(a), a
broadcaster cannot censor a "use" of a broadcast station by a legally
qualified candidate for public office. The Supreme Court has held
that since stations are not allowed to control what candidates say or
do on these programs, the station cannot be liable in civil suits for
libel." 17 The libel liability limitation and personal attack or political
endorsement exclusion speak to the concern raised by the CBS v.
DNC Court, that individual speakers are not accountable to the pub-
lic. Under this statute, speakers attacking or libeling other individu-
als or groups are not to be granted access. Should a station air a
personal or libelous attack inadvertently, the group or individual
making the attack would be fully liable under the applicable state
laws.
In addition to meeting its primary objective of increasing the di-
versity of viewpoints on the airwaves, this regulatory scheme has
several advantages. The presentation of political information that
cannot be censored by station operators, for example, may serve as
a partial counterweight to any reluctance those beholden to the gov-
ernment for their licenses might feel about airing criticism of the
status quo.'' 8
116. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1) (1982).
117. Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360
U.S. 525 (1959). See also Federal Communications Commission, The Law of Political
Broadcasting and Cablecasting: A Political Primer 42 (1984).
118. A former FCC attorney pointed out in the New York Times that the elimination
of the Fairness Doctrine would have the ironic consequence of enabling the FCC,
through its choice of who gets a license, to determine which viewpoints are aired. Let-
ter, Robert I. Field, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, § 4, at 8.
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This reasonable access proposal will also allow the voices of ad-
herents to be heard articulating their own viewpoints-a benefit
identified by the Supreme Court in Red Lion " 9 and CBS v. DNC, 120
and by the FCC when the Fairness Doctrine was enforced.
This proposal has the significant added advantage of being ad-
ministrable without requiring broadcasters to alter their own speech
to provide balance. Thus, administration should be far less burden-
some than under the previous Fairness Doctrine scheme. In fact,
because it requires little content monitoring of advertisements, this
system should prove less complicated than that in place for commer-
cial spots. t
2 '
B. Criticisms of the Editorial Advertising Access Statute
This proposed statute might be faulted for not completely elimi-
nating the danger that the Court spoke of in CBS v. DNC: that
wealthy groups will be able to determine the public affairs agenda of
the nation because only they will have the funds necessary to buy
time. 122 The limitation on costs and frequency of individual
messages mitigates this effect. While lowest unit rates will not en-
able many groups to buy 60 seconds on NBC's The Cosby Show, they
will enable some groups to purchase time locally. 123 The limitation
on the number of spots aired on any one viewpoint also limits the
effect of wealth dominance. Another way of equalizing opportuni-
ties for groups to buy time (though one beyond the scope of this
article) would be for Congress to fund a program of matching
grants, based on the size of a group's membership. In any case, the
absence of the Fairness Doctrine's requirement that various sides of
controversial issues be presented means that currently only the
119. 395 U.S. at 392 n.18, citingJ. Mill, On Liberty 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947).
120. 412 U.S. at 112.
121. NBC's Broadcast Standards Department, for example, reviews 50,000 commer-
cials annually in script and storyboard for such things as tasteful copy, supportable
health care claims and substantiated product comparisons. National Broadcasting Co.,
NBC Broadcast Standards for Television, Advertising Guidelines (May 1983). Twenty-
two thousand of these ads are finally produced; 12,000 to 14,000 are aired. Interview
with Richard Gitter, NBC, Network Interviews, supra note 104.
122. Judge Ralph Winter has argued that wealthy donors support causes across the
political spectrum, a factor that should reduce the danger that a privately financed edito-
rial advertising access scheme will skew public debate toward either the right or left. See
Winter, Political Financing and the Constitution, 486 Annals 41 (July 1986).
123. Robert Somerville, President of Independent Television Sales, estimates the
cost of a 30-second spot airing on a program with a 5 rating, reaching 4 1/2 million
households on independent broadcast stations nationwide, would be approximately
$18,000. Lowest unit rate for the same spot could be as low as 1/2 of that price. Tele-





wealthy can purchase access-the very system that concerned the
Court.
The reasonable-access-for-ads plan might also be criticized for its
use of the thirty-second and one-minute formats for the expression
of political information. In CBS v. DNC, for example, the networks
explained that such information was better conveyed in longer pub-
lic affairs programming. 124 That claim remains one justification for
the editorial advertising policies at the networks. 125 There is some
irony in this argument, however, as it is uncommon for an inter-
viewee on the evening news to speak any longer than 10-15
seconds. 1 26 News stories are often as short as 90 seconds, 1 2 7 and
each appears only once or twice, while editorial ads may have the
advantage of being viewed repeatedly, increasing comprehension.
The newspaper editorial ad, as the Court pointed out in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 128 constitutes an important outlet for the promul-
gation of political information and ideas (available at least to those
who read newspapers); these often contain no more text than could
be read aloud in one or two minutes. 129 In addition, this access pro-
posal would not preclude licensees from selling time for longer
presentations; such presentations would simply need to be kept
within the 10% of total time allocated to that issue that month.
The most important argument in favor of the short-segment for-
mat is that, for much of the population, it works.' 3 0 Short ads cap-
124. 412 U.S. at 118 (licensees' policy against editorial spot ads is expressly based
on a journalistic judgment that 10- to 60-second spot announcements are ill-suited to
intelligible treatment of public issues).
125. Network Interviews, supra note 104.
126. "The average 'sound bite' is about ten seconds and this has important conse-
quences for what can be said. One can express a stripped-down feeling or attitude in ten
seconds but it is rather difficult to make an argument. It is also very difficult to step
outside of conventional modes of thought: to frame an issue in a way that is unfamiliar to
the audience requires time for an explanation." Sound bites averaged 40 seconds in the
1960s and early 1970s. Hallin, supra note 112, at 18-19, 26.
127. The average television news story is only 90 seconds long, and political cover-
age generally brief. In the 1976 presidential election, a study of candidates' issue posi-
tions found they were generally covered in television news segments of 20 seconds or
less. T. Patterson, supra note 80, at 26, 159.
A new news program, produced along the lines of the newspaper USA Today, plans to
provide 35 items per 30-minute episode. Get Ready for McRather, Time, Apr. 11, 1988,
at 78.
128. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), cited in CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 192 (Brennan J.,
dissenting).
129. For several examples of such ads, prepared by unions, corporations, and non-
profit groups, see P. Sethi, Advocacy Advertising and Large Corporations 21-52, 312-17
(1977).
130. Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure find the argument that half-hour broad-
casts can better explicate complex campaign issues flawed in two ways: "First, and most
important, it overlooks a crucial difference between advertising spots and longer broad-
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ture audiences, and audiences built by entertainment can be
reached effectively with political information. 13' This effectiveness is
due, in part, to the fact that the number of people who will tune in
to explicitly political programming is small. 132 Moreover, audiences
most likely to choose political programming are generally already
better informed than those least likely to watch such shows.'
33
It also could be argued that this proposal will encourage broad-
casters to cut their own public affairs coverage, on the assumption
that the sale of editorial advertisements fulfills their responsibility as
public trustees. It would be a simple matter, however, for the FCC
to rule that editorial advertisements are a mere adjunct to the polit-
ical programming a licensee is required to present to meet the
public interest standard. Also, if the FCC does not view the presen-
tation of political programming as an essential licensee responsibil-
ity, this statute and the complementary candidate access statute
would ensure that all listeners and viewers would be at least mini-
mally informed.
There are at least five possible regimes for the future handling of
public affairs programming: (1) the FCC will require some public
affairs programming and such programming will be supplemented
by issue ads affordable only by the affluent; (2) the FCC will require
no political programming and only the views of the wealthy will be
heard; (3) the FCC will require no political programming and none
will be aired; (4) the FCC will require no political programming but
limited access for editorial advertisements will be permitted; or
(5) the FCC will require some political programming, which will be
supplemented by a system of limited access for editorial advertise-
ments. Of the five, it is clear that the fifth, which combines the edi-
torial ad access statute and a political programming requirement,
casts. People watch spots. Longer programs get turned off. Second, it exaggerates the
consequences of commercial brevity." Many 60-second spots contain as much relevant
content as a basic issue story on the nightly news, with 5-minute spots containing the
same content as a newspaper article. And infrequent newspaper readers, those less
likely to be informed, are also the television viewers least likely to watch a 30-minute
political broadcast. T. Patterson & R. McClure, supra note 71, at 120-21.
For a general discussion of advocacy advertising's ability to convey information, see P.
Sethi, supra note 129, at 237.
131. "But the fact remains that when faced with a political message many viewers or
voters will opt out, by changing the channel. The reality of this finding means that short
ads that capture audiences built by entertainment rather than political interest are and
will remain essential ingredients of political communication." Broadcast Media in Elec-
tions, supra note 77, at 86, 88 (testimony and statement of Dr. Christopher Arterton).
132. Id.




best meets the twin goals of expanding political information and
providing diverse voices and views.
Network administrative arguments against a reasonable access
plan are likely to come in two forms: that such a proposal will cost
them money; and that this amount of access, coupled with candidate
access, turns them into common carriers, a result the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 specifically prohibits.t 34 The answer to the former
criticism is that it is a speculative harm, at best. Licensees could
increase marginally their commercial ad rates so as to eliminate any
loss caused by the small decrease in ad spots available for commer-
cial sponsors. Moreover, the overall cost of this proposal should
still be considerably less than the response time they were required
to provide under the Fairness Doctrine. Similarly, monitoring and
scheduling requirements should be simpler under the proposed
first-come, first-served statutory plan because they do not require
the station to provide paid or unpaid contrasting views in the same
or equivalent time periods.
i3 5
The candidate access requirements make it clear that licensees
can be required to provide some access; the unanswered question is
just how much can be required before broadcasters are transformed
into common carriers. The proposed statute mandates just over
one hour per week of access, less than 1 % of the hours in a broad-
cast week. This minimal requirement should not push licensees
over the line into common carriage. If, however, while the candi-
date access requirements are in effect, Congress finds that the obli-
gation is too burdensome for broadcasters, the reasonable access
requirements for editorial ads could be lifted during the 45 days
before a primary and the 60 days before a general election when the
candidate access requirements are in effect. Congress, of course,
also has the option of amending the common carrier provision or of
simply redefining the grant to licensees as the right to broadcast
134. "[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is
so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1983).
135. For a period prior to 1987, advocacy advertising on ABC-owned radio and tele-
vision stations was permitted during the afternoon movie period, after midnight, and
between 7:30 and 8 p.m. A look at the guidelines for acceptance of such advertising
indicates the practice was much like that recommended in the proposed statute. ABC
checked for personal attacks, defamatory statements, and candidate endorsements, none
of which was permitted. ABC also required that these ads be approved by the Broadcast
Standards and Practices Department and the General Manager of the Station, a more
comprehensive review than that required under the regime proposed here. American
Broadcasting Co., Advocacy Advertising Guidelines, ABC-Owned Radio and Television
Stations 1 (Apr. 1, 1986).
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only 166 hours and 57 minutes per week instead of the 168 hours
currently allocated.
Finally, this proposal may be faulted for not completely meeting
what Alexander Meiklejohn identified as an essential first amend-
ment goal, averred in CBS v. DNC, "not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said."' 136 While it is true
that the proposed system of access cannot guarantee that all informa-
tion necessary to self-government is conveyed, it certainly would in-
crease the odds.
Conclusion
More than 60 years ago, when Congress first intervened to bring
order to the electromagnetic spectrum, it decided to allocate much
of the spectrum space to radio broadcasting rather than to other
claimants because of the important contribution broadcasting could
make to an informed electorate. 3 7 Until Congress finds that devel-
oping audio and visual technologies have replaced broadcast in per-
forming this function, it cannot abrogate its regulatory role. When
the Supreme Court decided CBS v. DNC 15 years ago, a requirement
that broadcasters accept editorial advertisements, in addition to cov-
ering public issues and presenting contrasting views at their own
expense, may have seemed too much to ask. But absent the Fairness
Doctrine, an editorial access requirement is less a burden than an
appropriate means of balancing the public's right to be informed
against the broadcasters' right to speak.
When the Fairness Doctrine was in operation-and being en-
forced-broadcasters often handled political issues by featuring
"objective" newspeople explaining the controversy and its signifi-
cance. That approach may represent good journalism, 3 8 but it can-
not make the same contribution to public discourse that the
advocacy of a Thomas Paine, or his modern day broadcast
equivalent, can. Viewer access to the impassioned argument of the
adherent seems all the more valuable in a period when political cyni-
cism is high and participation is low. Even if Congress should suc-
ceed in resurrecting the Fairness Doctrine, an issue advertising
136. A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 26 (1948), cited in CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at
122.
137. H. Geller, The Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting: Problems and Suggested
Courses of Action 2 (1973).
138. For a discussion of ways in which the press can improve its coverage of govern-





access statute would serve as an important complement because edi-
torial advertising can enrich the public debate in a unique and im-
portant way.
Cultural, educational, and entertainment programming will al-
ways compete with political programming for broadcasters' and
viewers' attention. Moreover, lengthy public affairs programs are
unlikely to capture the very viewers who-for economic and educa-
tional reasons-rely on television for their political information. By
presenting political issues in manageable time segments, argued by
those with strong preferences for particular outcomes, a plan for
editorial access can circumvent broadcasters' tendency toavoid con-
troversy and some audiences' tendency to avoid political broadcasts.
The certain result will be a better-informed citizenry and a broader
public debate.
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